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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EARNEST CHARLES FORD, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20061165-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
attempted murder, a first degree felony, and possession or use of 
a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony (R. 148-
49). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (West 2004) (R. 158, 160). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did trial counsel perform ineffectively by not filing a 
motion to sever, where such a motion would not have been granted 
because the evidence against defendant was so overwhelming as to 
create no likelihood of a more favorable trial outcome for him? 
u,
*In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim 
based on counsel's failure to seek severance, the defendant must 
demonstrate both that the motion should have been granted and "a 
reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.'" State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App 
1990)(quoting State v. Warren, 779 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Wash. App. 
1989)). Ineffective assistance presents a question of law, 
reviewed on the record of the underlying trial. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M 16-17, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Vos, 2007 
UT App. 215, 1 9, 580 Utah Adv. Rep. 20. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are 
dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count 
each of attempted murder with injury, a first degree felony, and 
possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a 
second degree felony (R. 73-74). A jury convicted him as charged 
(R. 89-90; R. 145-46; R. 165: 36). The court sentenced defendant 
to a five-to-life term in the Utah State Prison on the first 
degree felony, a concurrent one-to-fifteen year term on the 
second degree felony, and a consecutive one-year weapons 
enhancement (R. 149). The court ordered this sentence to run 
consecutive to the prison sentence defendant was already serving 
(Id.). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 151). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, a methamphetamine user also known as "Half Pint," 
was just over four feet tall, used wrist crutches to walk, and 
breathed with the assistance of a tracheotomy tube and 
supplemental oxygen (R. 3; R. 163: 180, 186; R. 164: 100). He 
met the victim, Felicia, at a New Year's Eve party (R. 163: 99). 
Three weeks later, Felicia visited defendant at his 
apartment because, as she explained at trial, "I knew that he 
would get me high and that I wouldn't have to pay" (Id. at 101) . 
The two smoked crack cocaine together, Felicia aiding defendant 
by circling her hand and positioning it against defendant's lips, 
and then exhaling the smoke through her hand into his mouth 
(Id.). They smoked "quite a bit" and got "very high" (Id. at 
102). Defendant bought Chinese takeout and they ate. 
Afterwards, they drank defendant's tequila, consuming "quite a 
bit of the bottle" (Id. at 103). Felicia then suggested that 
they smoke more crack (Id.). 
What happened next is not entirely clear. Felicia testified 
that defendant refused to share his crack with her unless she 
"shotgunned" the smoke directly into his mouth, without using her 
hand as a barrier between their lips (Id. at 103-04).x She 
refused (Id. at 104). According to her, defendant "freaked out" . 
at her refusal, and they engaged in an aggressive physical and 
1
 Ingesting drugs through mouth-to-mouth contact is 
sometimes referred to as "shotgunning" or "supercharging." See 
R. 163: 104. 
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verbal fight (Id.). Felicia testified that defendant "got very 
angry and started telling me that I was not going to smoke his 
dope for free, that I was a bitch, a whore, a slut, I would not 
get away with taking . '. . from him" (Id. ). In turn, she told 
him, among other things, "that I could have someone hurt him" 
(Id. at 105). He got up and approached her, she shoved him down 
on a bed, he fell to the floor and then grabbed her foot, and 
then she kicked him away and left the house (Id. at 105-06). 
For his part, defendant told the police that Felicia "thought he 
was a punk" and that if she thought she could "come over and 
smoke up his . . . shit and then leave, . . . he wasn't going for 
that" (R. 164: 99; accord id. at 29, 70, 77, 83, 89). Defendant 
also maintained that before leaving his apartment, Felicia took 
his cell phone, some money, a coat, and a bottle of scotch (Id. 
at 68, 99, 111, 116). 
Felicia fled about a block away to the home of her cousin, 
Edward (R. 163: 107).2 Both Edward and another cousin testified 
that defendant had stopped by the house either earlier that day 
or the previous day to warn Felicia "to stay away from him or he 
would shoot her punk ass" (Id. at 125; accord id. at 167).3 
According to Edward, when Felicia showed up at his home after the 
2
 Police officers later found a cell phone, a jacket, a 
bottle of scotch, and some money in prescription pill bottles 
marked with defendant's name at Edward's home (R. 164: 41, 47, 
52-53, 55-56, 58-59). 
3
 Felicia had not received this message when she visited 
defendant at his apartment (R. 163: 125-26, 167). 
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fight with defendant, she asked to be let in and told him that 
Half Pint had grabbed her breasts and tried to rape her and that 
she had slapped him and told him she wasn't a prostitute (Id. at 
127, 145). She wanted Edward to go back to defendant's apartment 
with her to retaliate (Id. at 127, 146). Edward declined, 
stating he had "nothing to do with it" (Id. at 127). 
Three or four minutes after Felicia arrived, Edward "[h]eard 
a truck rumble up the driveway, a horn honk" (Id. at 126). 
Telling Felicia to stay in the house, Edward walked outside and 
immediately recognized defendant's truck (Id. at 131). 
Describing the events as happening "so fast, it was just like a 
movie," Edward described seeing defendant, approaching the truck, 
and hearing defendant ask, "Where's your punk-assed cousin?" (Id. 
at 132-33). Edward testified that as he walked up to the truck, 
"I heard a click, click[,] [a]nd I said, oh, shit, gun. And I 
stepped to the side, and out of my peripheral vision I seen 
Felicia" (Id. at 133).4 He continued, "I heard two shots, and 
[Felicia] said, Ah, I'm hit, and turned around and ran into the 
[house]" (Id.). He heard a third shot (Id. at 134). Edward 
moved under cover and stayed out of sight until defendant backed 
out of the driveway and drove off (Id. at 134-37) . 
Inside the home, Felicia had collapsed on the floor, 
bleeding profusely. Nonetheless, she was able to identify 
4
 Unbeknownst to Edward, Felicia had followed him out of 
the house (R. 163: 133). 
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defendant, both by given name and nickname, to police officers 
prior to being transported to the hospital (Id. at 180; R. 164: 
20). The surgeon who treated Felicia at the emergency room 
testified that she was on "death's doorstep" when she arrived, 
having sustained a life-threatening gunshot wound that penetrated 
her lung, diaphragm, liver, stomach, and colon and another 
gunshot wound to her arm (R. 164: 7-8, 10-12). She had lost at 
least one-third of her blood volume (Id. at 6, 12).5 
Meanwhile, based on Felicia's identification, police located 
defendant at his apartment, where they handcuffed and mirandized 
him (Id. at 24-25, 28-29, 76, 96). When one officer told 
defendant that Felicia was still alive, he reacted with 
"disgust[]" (R. 163: 186). The officer testified, "He let out 
what I'd describe as kind of an exasperated breath of air and 
kind of a scowl. He kind of went like — like he'd — he was 
pretty disappointed that perhaps she was still alive" (Id.; 
accord R. 16 4 : 31) . 
After agreeing to a police station interview, defendant 
received a second Miranda warning and then spoke with a police 
officer (R. 164: 97-99). Defendant told the officer that he went 
to Edward's house with a revolver because he thought he would 
find Felicia there (Id. at 100). Defendant drove up to the house 
5
 Felicia had spent three and a half months in the hospital 
and undergone nine corrective surgeries at the time of trial (R. 
163: 109). 
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and called for Edward to come outside (Id.). According to 
defendant, Felicia followed Edward outside, calling defendant a 
punk and trying to hit him (Id. at 101). Defendant reached under 
his seat and pulled out the revolver (Id.). After that, 
defendant told the officer, "everything got quiet," and he 
remembered nothing further (Id.), Later, in a written statement, 
when asked "Is it possible that you shot [Felicia]?", defendant 
responded, "Yes" (Id_^  at 112). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance 
because his trial counsel did not move to sever the charge of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person from the 
charge of attempted murder. He asserts that, absent this 
substandard performance, he would have enjoyed a more favorable 
trial outcome. This claim is most easily disposed of on the 
prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness analysis, an analytical 
approach consistent with the statute governing joinder, which 
directs severance when joinder would prejudice defendant. 
Here, defendant fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced 
when two witnesses saw him commit the crime and he as much as 
admitted to it. He argues only that a "strong possibility" of a 
better outcome existed because the "two main witnesses had 
credibility issues" (Br. of Aplt. at 19). This argument ignores 
the well-settled role of the jury as the sole judge of witness 
credibility. When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
7 
jury's verdict, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. 
It is for this reason, not the fact of a previous, unspecified 
felony conviction, that the jury found him guilty. Defendant's 
conviction, therefore, should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM 
INEFFECTIVELY BY NOT FILING A 
MOTION TO SEVER WHERE SUCH A MOTION 
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WAS SO 
OVERWHELMING AS TO CREATE NO 
LIKELIHOOD OF A MORE FAVORABLE 
TRIAL OUTCOME 
Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial. He asserts that his counsel performed 
deficiently by not moving to sever the charge of possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person from the attempted murder charge 
(Br. of Aplt. at 13). He also asserts that he suffered prejudice 
because, absent the jury's knowledge of his previous felony 
conviction and given the dubious credibility of the witnesses, he 
would have enjoyed a "strong possibility" of a more favorable 
trial outcome. Id. at 18-19. 
"
AIn order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim 
based on counsel's failure to seek severance, the defendant must 
demonstrate both that the motion should have been granted and "a 
reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.'" State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App 
8 
1990)(quoting State v. Warren, 779 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Wash. App. 
1989)). 
While defendant's claim fails on both prongs of this test 
for ineffectiveness, this Court may dispose of it most 
efficiently by addressing the prejudice component. See Parsons 
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1999) (when it is "easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice, we will do so without addressing whether 
counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable")(quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)) (other 
citations omitted). This approach is consistent with the statute 
governing joinder of offenses, which provides for mandatory 
severance of charges only when joinder would prejudice defendant: 
If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses . . . , the court shall order an 
election of separate trials of separate 
counts, . . . or provide other relief as 
justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4) (a) (West 2004). To establish 
prejudice, "a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to 
support ya reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.'" Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694). 
Defendant falls well short of meeting this standard. He 
argues only that, absent the stipulation to defendant's prior 
conviction, "[t]here is a strong possibility that the outcome for 
9 
the Defendant would have been more favorable . . . [because t]he 
State's two main witnesses had credibility issues." Br. of Aplt. 
at 19. Defendant's claim fails because the evidence against him 
was overwhelming. See, e.g., State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 958-59 
(Utah App 1992)("Since the evidence of defendants' guilt was 
overwhelming, the balance was tipped even without the prior 
convictions evidence"); State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 385-87 
(Utah App 1997)(defendant not prejudiced by joinder where 
overwhelming evidence supported both charges). 
There is simply no dispute about the critical facts upon 
which the jury based its conviction. Two witnesses reported that 
defendant had earlier stopped by Edward's home and threatened to 
kill Felicia (R. 163: 125-126, 167). Felicia described in detail 
fighting physically with defendant just before the shooting (Id. 
at 104-06). For his part, defendant said only that Felicia had 
hit and robbed him and that his "mama didn't raise [him] to wear 
no girls' panties" (R. 164 at 77, 83, 89, 111). Felicia, 
"visibly upset" after the fight, fled to Edward's house (R. 163 
at 107, 127, 152, 165). Defendant showed up minutes later (Id. 
at 107, 128). Edward came out of the house and immediately 
recognized defendant, the sole occupant of the truck (Id. at 
131). Defendant, who admitted that he had a revolver with him, 
asked for Felicia (IdL. at 132-33, R. 164: 101, 111). When 
Felicia came out of the house, she immediately sustained two 
gunshot wounds, one of which almost killed her (Id. at 7-8). 
10 
Prior to being transported to the hospital, Felicia identified 
defendant as the shooter (R. 163: 180; R. 164: 20). Defendant 
admitted that he "possibl[y]" shot Felicia (R. 164: 112). 
Under these factual circumstances, there is no possibility 
that the jury convicted defendant because it knew that he had a 
previous felony conviction. It convicted him because the 
evidence showed beyond any reasonable doubt that he was guilty. 
Indeed, defendant offered no viable defense. He asserted only 
that when he arrived in his truck at Edward's house, Edward and 
Felicia came outside and punched him in the face, thus justifying 
the use of force in return (R. 163: 185; R. 164: 30, 68; R. 165: 
24-26). Notably, however, after telling the police that he had 
been punched in the face, defendant then retreated somewhat from 
this story, writing in his confession that Felicia "come out [of 
the house] calling me a punk and tried to swing on me" (Statement 
of Defendant, at 2 (in manila envelope, unnumbered)(emphasis 
added); accord R. 164: 101). In any event, no physical evidence 
corroborated defendant's version of events, and nowhere does he 
deny that he shot Felicia (R. 163: 186). In the end, defendant's 
claim that, but for the fact of his previous felony conviction, 
he would have enjoyed a more favorable trial outcome, borders on 
the frivolous. 
Moreover, counsel did not render deficient performance by 
not moving to sever because the evidence of defendant's 
culpability was so overwhelming—and the concomitant lack of 
11 
prejudice so clear—that the trial court plainly would have denied 
the motion. Because counsel could not have established that 
joinder would harm defendant and thus mandate severance, filing a 
motion to sever would thus have been futile. See State v. 
Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, 5 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that 
"failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be 
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
assistance.")(citation omitted); State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 1 
34, 989 P.2d 52 (same). For this additional reason, his claim 
fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count each of attempted murder, a first degree 
felony, and possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj_ day of August, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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